Case Review

(Beijing Shisanba Cosmetic Surgery Hospital v. Beijing New Time EverCare XingFu Cosmetic Hospital., and Baidu Time Network Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd. for unfair competition dispute)

Beijing Shisanba Cosmetic Surgery Hospital (Shisanba) filed a complaint stating that EverCare was using its reputable business name, in Beijing and elsewhere in the nation. The complaint alleged that EverCare, having no connection with Shisanba, however, advertised itself under Shisanba by appropriating the name as a keyword through the search engine of Baidu.com, thereby diverting consumers who searched for Shisanba to the EverCare website. In addition, EverCare, by such advertisements, was in violation of the principle of good-faith and violated the plaintiff’s right to the corporate name, and committed unfair competition.

In addition to EverCare, Shisanba’s complaint named Baidu Online Network Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd. (Baidu Online), Baidu Netcom Science and Technology Co. Ltd. (Baidu Netcom), and Baidu Time Network Technology Co., Ltd. (Baidu Time), as joint managers of the Baidu search engine. Shisanba argued that these parties assumed responsibilities for examining the advertising content of EverCare and its relationship with Shisanba, failed to carry the responsibilities, and should thus be jointly liable for damages. Plaintiff pleaded the court to issue a permanent injunction against EverCare, Baidu Online, Baidu Netcom, and Baidu Time from misappropriating plaintiff’s name, and prayed for compensatory damages of 477,569Yuan, plus reasonable costs of 51,020Yuan.

EverCare admitted that it did used the keyword Shisanba as a “pay per click” (PPC) bid at Baidu.com due to employee errors, but in challenging Shisanba’s complaints, denied unfair competition, saying that the amount of damages proposed by Shisanba lacked a proper basis, and did not flow from EverCare’s actions.

Baidu Online, Baidu Netcom, and Baidu Time (collectively Baidu) argued that Shisanba, being a business name of Shisanba Hospital, did not point to the Hospital alone as an exclusive right holder, and therefore does not confer the Hospital any right to preventing others from utilizing the word; that Shisanba, being a business name of Shisanba Hospital, was not well-known and therefore EverCare’s use of the name would not result in mistakes; that EverCare’s actual use of Shisanba as a keyword in PPC bidding was an act engaging a search engine service, and did not exceed the confines of search services. EveryCare’s defense was that PPC bidding was not advertising; that Baidu did carry the burden of examining the keywords provided by its customers, but the number of possible keywords were so extensive that Baidu could not reasonably determine whether or not a keyword was another’s trademark or trade name. In order to prevent infringement, Baidu Time offered a complaint channel on its website, and removed the Shisanba keyword registered by EverCare upon receipt of Shisanba’s complaint. Consequently, Baidu did not commit an intentional or negligent wrong, and Baidu Time and Baidu Netcom did not contribute to EverCare’s unfair competition; and therefore, prayed for a dismissal of the Hospital’s complaint.

The People’s Court of Chaoyang District, Beijing found in favor of Shisanba, stating the following: Shisanba Cosmetic Surgery Hospital had received industry-wide honors for three consecutive years since its incorporation, establishing certain fame on the market. Shisanba, as the hospital’s business, is protected under the Unfair Competition Law, which bars unauthorized use by others. EverCare Hospital, being the operator of a cosmetic surgery business similar to Shisanba Hospital, and a competitor in the same business, had no connection with the word Shisanba and should have known that Shisanba was the business name of Shisanba Hospital; yet it appropriated the word as a keyword for Baidu’s PPC bidding, thereby redirecting consumers typing in the word “Shisanba” to find information about Shisanba Hospital to EverCare’s website and misleading consumers to explore the EverCare website. The court concluded that such activities by EverCare would necessarily reduce click rate of Shisanba’s website, and inversely increase traffic volume of EverCare, obviously misappropriating Shisanba’s market share, diminishing Shisanba’s advertisement effects, thus putting Shisanba in a disadvantaged market position; and that as a result, EverCare Hospital clearly demonstrated bad-faith intention to cause harm, and engaged in unfair competition, in breach of the good-faith principle in market competition, and must therefore bear the legal consequences.

Baidu search engine was owned by Baidu Netcom, whose PPC bid business was operated by Baidu Time and its technical development was maintained by Baidu Online. Shisanba Hospital did not offer any evidence showing that the Baidu PPC bidding service promoted on the Baidu search engine had any connection with Baidu Online, and, Shisanba’s claim for Baidu Online’s infringement liabilities was unsupported by facts and was rejected.

Anyone who engages in civil activities should observe the business code of conduct of good faith, by using reasonable diligence as suitable for its own business activities and the industry requirements to avoid infringing upon the legal rights and interests of others. The PPC bidding, which is technically a search engine service, is a value-added Internet service, which brings direct commercial benefits to a business operator. However, because of the human intervention of the search results,it generates an unequal and unnatural search result manipulated through the search engine.

Although Baidu Time exercised some care when entering into the contract with EverCare by checking its business license, the medical permit, and the domain name recordal paper, it failed to perform this obligation fully and accurately as explicitly provided in its General Rules publicized on the website of the Baidu search engine. The Rules stated that Baidu Time will not provide the service until it has checked and approved the keyword, and it is obligated to check keywords for information leading to pornography, gambling or controlled substances, as well as keywords which otherwise would infringe upon the copyrights or other rights of other parties. That is to say, Baidu Time took the obligation upon itself to examine keywords for possible infringement upon the rights of others.

In the case, however, contrary to its promise, Baidu Time argued that it was able to examine keywords for pornographic, gambling or controlled substance information, or infringement upon well-known trademarks, but unable to verify infringement upon regular trademarks or business names. Due to Baidu Time’s failure to live up to its promise, EverCare was able to secure Shisanba as its keyword, which was in no way connected with. To sum up, in the case, Baidu Time was found to be subjectively at fault and objectively helped EverCare Hospital carry out the unfair competition and was held jointly liable with EverCare.

Baidu Netcom, who owns the Baidu search engine, but does not run the PPC bidding service, and could not reasonable foresee any possible infringement in the service, was subjectively not in fault and was not be held liable for EverCare’s use of Shisanba as its keyword. Since the Shisanba keyword as submitted by EverCare had been removed and that EverCare had ceased using Shisanba as its keyword, Shisanba’s request for an injunction had become moot. As to the amount of compensation for the economic losses, the amount claimed by Shisanba, 477,569Yuan, on the basis of the costs of its advertisements on newspapers, magazines, TV stations and buses, was found to lack a reasonable basis and was not affirmed by this court. The court entered this ruling considering the audiences of the Internet medium as different from those of the above media and that the unfair competition from EverCare did not eliminate the advertising effects of Shisanba on these media.

The compensatory amount was determined with consideration to the degree of fame of Shisanba as a business name, the degree of subjective fault of the defendant, and the influence of the infringement. The notary expense, as a reasonable expense of the case, was affirmed. The attorney fee, as another reasonable expense of the case, if appropriate and necessary, was affirmed.

The Judgment

The People’s Court of Chaoyang District, Beijing, in accordance with Article 130 of the General Principles of the Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China, Article 5(3) and Paragraph 1 of Article 20 of the Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China, and Paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Law Application Issues in the Trial of Unfair Competition-related Civil Cases, rendered its judgments as follows: 1. Beijing New Time EverCare XingFu Cosmetic Surgery Hospital and Baidu Time Network Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd. shall pay jointly and severally to Beijing Shisanba Cosmetic Hospital 100,000Yuan as damages sustained by the latter; 2. Beijing New Time Yimei’er Happiness Cosmetic Surgery Special Hospital Co., Ltd. and Baidu Time Network Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd. shall pay jointly and severally to Beijing Shisanba Cosmetic Surgery Hospital Yuan31,020 for the reasonable expenses incurred by the latter; and 3. The other claims of Beijing Shisanba Cosmetic Surgery Hospital are dismissed. EverCare and Baidu Netcom appealed and the appeal was resolved through mediation in the second instance trial.

Typicality Analysis

As network technologies have been developing fast, network applications have spread deeply into every aspect of social life. Consequently, there have been much more complex disputes involving the network. Among them, in judicial practice, Internet-based e-business infringement disputes have emerged in greater numbers; generating a wider variety and more complex disputes both technically and legally.

It should be noted that the current judicial practice, to some extent and degree, followed inconsistent criteria in deciding network-related cases. The core issue is how to correctly find fault for infringement liabilities of network service providers. People who hold opposite opinions often draw different conclusions from the same specific business modes of the defendants. In the opinion of this author, the discussion of the issue may begin with the doctrine of technology neutrality, to rearrange the theories, clear up the sources and guide the judicial practice correctly.

I. Types of Network Service Providers and Infringement Liabilities

1. Types of Network Service Providers

Network service providers are generally divided into Internet Content Providers (ICPs) and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). It should be noted that the attributions of ICP and ISP are not fixed and clearly defined. Often network service providers upload both their own data (when they are ICPs) and provide data uploaded by others (when they are ISPs). For this reason, strictly speaking, an ICP or ISP cannot be identified unless a specific act is given, and only at that moment is the identification meaningful. It should also be noted that an ICP or ISP may not always be a firm, but can be an individual person. In particular, theoretically speaking, any netizen can be an ICP.

2. Criteria to Differentiate between ICP and ISP, and Attribution of Infringement Liability

According to the Measures on Administrative Protection of Internet-related Copyrights, an “Internet Content Provider” means an Internet user who publishes the content on the Internet. To “publish” here means mainly to upload or to reprint the content, and does not mean to automatically access, automatically store, link, search, or provide information storage space for it. An “Internet Information Service Provider” means a subject who, through the Internet, automatically provides uploading, storing, linking or searching functions for works of authorship or audio/visual products, upon the instruction from the Internet Content Provider, in its Internet information service activities.

In the theoretical circle of China, great controversies exist as to the system of infringement liability attribution. For infringement by network service providers, mainly the fault liability doctrine should be applicable, the presumptive fault liability doctrine applicable under special circumstances, and the no-fault liability doctrine should not be applicable; as the equitable liability doctrine is a rule of infringement damages rather than a doctrine of infringement liability attribution.

a. Infringement Liability Attribution for ICPs

For infringement liability attribution for ICPs, the presumptive fault doctrine should be applicable, as is generally agreed both theoretically and practically. The doctrine contains the same four constitutive elements as the fault liability doctrine does, namely, actual damage, illegal act, causation and subjective fault. The plaintiff is responsible for producing evidence on the illegal act, proof of damage and the causation, and the defendant is presumed to be at fault. Regarding the subjective fault of the defendant, the burden of proof is shifted to the defendant: the presumptive fault will be overturned if the proof is successful, or affirmed if the proof is insufficient or ineffective.

The test for subjective fault should be due diligence. In the opinion of this author, ICPs should be differentiated for due diligence, considering the knowledge level of common netizens and professional network companies. The obligation on them should be less strict than that on publishers, and generally include examinations on whether the content and the name of the work of authorship obviously conflict with each other, whether the right owner is the provider of the work of authorship, or whether the provider has obtained approval from the right owner.

However, there is another issue worth discussing. It is certain that infringement cannot be established if the defendant proves that it does not possess subjective fault, but in this case, we should go further as to whether the plaintiff may claim that the defendant should return his unjust enrichment. For publishers, this is tenable, by referring to Paragraph 3 of Article 20 of the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on a Few Issues in the Trial of Copyright-related Civil Disputes.

b. Infringement Liability Attribution for ISPs

The computerized network includes a few stages or levels of information dissemination, because network technologies are characterized by their wide, willful and free connections. In fact, any information dissemination is a process. This is stressed because the information dissemination on the computerized network can be divided into a few stages or levels totally different from each other, and the subjects on each stage or level contribute differently to the total process and hence come to have different rights and obligations. Therefore, compared with the non-networking environment (or the traditional environment), the information dissemination on the networking environment has one or more disseminators on each level who generally do not have a common intent. This characteristic is shown when the dissemination of works of authorship on the network often needs several Internet information service providers on different levels, who usually do not have a common intent in common to connect with each other. For ISPs, the fault liability doctrine should be applicable to attribute their infringement liabilities, which includes such constitutive elements as actual damage, illegal behavior, causation and subjective fault.

It should be noted that in traditional civil law theories, infringement liabilities are remedies in damages. The remedies enumerated in the General Rules of Civil Code, under Article 134, Paragraph 1, are the “civil remedies,” not just “tort remedies.” A “claim in rem” (or a claim based on property rights) should be adopted, which, according to Mr. Liang Huixing, is the right of a property owner, when the fullness of his property is interfered with, or threatened to be interfered with, to demand action or inaction from another, to enjoin such interference or to prevent threat of such interference. The object of the right should, of course, be limited to tangible things.

Such absolute rights as property rights, intellectual property rights and personal rights should all contain similar “absolute claims.” The absolute claim is not based on fault of the wrongdoer. The result of enforcing such absolute right is injunctive relief. What was discussed before for fault liabilities was merely a criterion for claims in debt. This reasoning explains why an ISP, in the absence of intent, will still be liable for injunctive relief as a civil liability.

The differentiation between ICPs and ISPs is intended to test if the “safe harbor” rule is applicable. ICPs, who publish the infringing content, are not allowed to enter the safe harbor. ISPs, however, should be allowed to enter the safe harbor, depending on the circumstances. The safe harbor for ISPs is established on the fact that the amount of information is huge and changes rapidly on the network and an unknowing ISP can not reasonably determine every copyright-related issue in the information. For this sake, the legislation allows ISPs to only bear the civil liability to cease the infringement (by disconnecting from or removing the content), without having to pay for damages.

II. Technology Neutrality

In intellectual property law, the technology neutrality doctrine does not mean generally the inclusiveness of legislation considering future technological developments, but has its own specific meaning. In intellectual property law, it is also known as the doctrine of “substantial non-infringing use,” which means that the defendant may be exonerated from of its infringement liability if the commodity of commerce or service provided by the defendant has both legal and illegal uses. It began with the Sony’s “Betamax case” decided by the Supreme Court of the United States (Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)) and is also called the “Sony rule.”

In its decision, the Supreme Court of the United States cited the “staple article or commodity of commerce” analysis of patent law. The doctrine is incorporated in 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), which at the time provided,

Whoever offers to sell or sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.

From the provision, in the context of patent law, a contributory infringing act must satisfy the following requirements: (1) the existence of direct infringement, that is, the infringer exploits the patent, for example, by manufacturing or selling the patented product without permission; (2) subjective intent, that is, the infringer knows that the thing it sells is specially adapted to infringing use; (3) contributory act, that is, the infringer sells, offers to sell, or imports a material component of the patented product; and (4) the object of infringement is a non-staple article made especially or adapted for use in an infringement of the patent, not suitable for substantial non-infringing use.

III. Application of Technology Neutrality in Judicial Practice

Although the technology neutrality doctrine is applied under circumstances where the defendant is liable for infringement, it is frequently used by the defendant in litigations involving Internet-based e-business infringement disputes as a defense to infringement liabilities. Moreover, the doctrine often causes the judge, when forming its discretion, to place overemphasis on evaluating the business mode other than the specific behavior of the defendant. This author has seen many written judgments which contain the following two viewpoints:

One view says that (1) in the reality of Internet nowadays in China, an absolute majority of the movie or musical works of authorship on the Internet have been uploaded without permission from the right owners; (2) most netizens and professional network service providers know this; and (3) the network service providers who provide movie or musical works profit hugely from the works of others, but the right owners do not receive their reasonable share. On the above background, this view holds that the special business mode of the network service providers who provide movie or musical works of authorship is mostly intended for infringing use, and they are well aware of this. The sued websites which provide hot lists or promotional contents should not enter the safe harbor, but bear the infringement liability and pay for damages, no matter whether the disputed works of authorship are included in such lists or contents.

The other view clearly shows the technology neutrality doctrine. It believes that the business mode of the defendant can be employed not only for infringing use, but also for non-infringing use normally, that is, the “substantial non-infringing use.” Thus, according to the technology neutrality doctrine, the defendant should be allowed to enter the safe harbor, without bearing the infringement liability and paying for damages.

The first view is theoretically based on the “substantial infringing use,” that is, the defendant should be held liable for infringement damages, as long as the specific business mode can normally be employed for infringing use. This is an inversed application of the technology neutrality doctrine. The second view is totally different, but may lead to the abuse of the doctrine. This leads to the question: how does one determine the liability on the defendant, when the specific business mode of the defendant can be employed for both infringing and non-infringing uses? Moreover, should infringement determination be limited to the use test, for in judicial practice, often a business mode can have both infringing and non-infringing use?

IV. Correct Understanding and Application of the Doctrine

To solve the above problems, we should correctly understand and employ the technology neutrality doctrine. It does not consider the use alone, but contains other constitutive elements. The most essential of them, this author believes, is fault. The center of the examination should not be use, but fault.  Fault should not be viewed in general terms, but in specific terms; not in the context of the specific business mode, but in the context of the specific behavior. It should be case specific, exact and concrete. In network-based copyright infringement disputes, fault is determined often on whether the infringer knows or should have known the infringement.

1. What does the Infringer Know or Should It Have Known?

In judicial practice, this author often sees ISPs complaining that they know the disputed work is well known, and no reasonable person would expect that the right owner would have uploaded the work to the Internet in a given period of time, but without their knowledge, the work has already been stored in their information storage space. Some ISPs say that despite their selecting, editing or making a top list of works, since the disputed work does not appear in the top list, it should not be determined that they know or should have known about the infringement. In the opinion of this author, what an ISP knows or should have known is being contained in information storage space provided by the ISP should be determined on a case by case basis. It should be definitd in a given case, that is, both the disputed content and the disputed service behavior are fixed. This issue has two aspects: 1. The ISP knows or should have known that the disputed content exists in its information storage space; and 2. The ISP knows or should have known the high probability that the disputed content is illegally uploaded.

2. Tests for the Doctrine of “Know” or “should Have Known”

To “know” means that subjectively, the network service provider clearly knows the above situation. That one “should have known” means that objectively, the network service provider, as a reasonable professional service provider, should clearly know in the above situation, considering the circumstances.

3. Usual Evidences for “should Have Known” in Judicial Practice

Whether the ISP should have known that the disputed content exists in its information storage space may be determined based on the editing and promoting behavior of the ISP. However, it should not be determined that the ISP should have known it unless and until the content so edited or promoted contains the disputed work. Whether the ISP should have known the high probability that the disputed content may be illegally uploaded may be determined on the high fame of the disputed content and whether it is provided by the ISP in a period when it is currently or contemporaneously being shown on TV, in theatres, radio, or other mainstream media.

4. Typical Issues in Judicial Practice

In the opinion of this author, currently the courts have been so strict with the criteria for the fault of ISPs that almost no ISPs have entered the safe harbor.

(1) Does the Regulations on Administration of Internet-based Audio/Visual Program Services require websites to be responsible for the prior examination of copyright-related issues of audio, and movie/TV works?

The first-instance judgment of a case holds that according to the Regulations on Administration of Internet-related Audio/Visual Program Services as issued by the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television and the former Ministry of Information Industry, effective on January 31, 2008, the audio/visual programs provided by Internet-based audio/visual program service providers, to which Internet operators have access, shall comply with relevant provisions of relevant laws, administrative rules and ministerial regulations and never contain any reactionary, violent or pornographic contents or contents forbidden by relevant laws, administrative rules and regulations of the state. Therefore, the defendant who runs the video-sharing website concerned is responsible to examine the video contents before they are uploaded to the website by the users.

This author holds this view is incorrect because of the following: 1. The provision is mainly intended to protect the core socialist cultures and values and is special socialist ideology. 2. In terms of practical operations, what to examine mainly are contents that are not copyright-related, but endanger state safety, release state secrets, damage national unity, and spread information on cults, superstitions, pornography and violence. 3. The provision is under serious attack from antagonistic forces in China and other countries. The additional imposition of copyright-related examination will cause more websites to turn to the opposite site and be taken advantage of by the antagonistic forces. This will finally affect the realization of the main goals of the provision.

(2) Does the categorization or listing by website of movie/TV works mean they should have more due diligence?

The first-instance judgment of a case holds that the defendant sorted and categorized the videos on its website, and set up special channels of Movie and TV Plays with detailed classifications. Generally speaking, it is highly improbable that the copyright owner of a movie/TV work, to which he makes a huge investment, would permit, without charge, Internet users to spread it on the Internet. Therefore, the defendant should be more careful with the video contents in the above channels.

This is also incorrect, because of the following: 1. Currently most video-sharing websites have categories and lists of movie/TV works. If higher due diligence criteria were stipulated, the higher criteria would become a common rather than a special standard for all video-sharing websites. 2. This viewpoint, if adopted, could not be directed towards individual cases, in the fault determination of the defendant.

5. The Difficulty in Fixing the Infringer in the Internet Environment, and Its Specialness in the e-Business Environment

Under Internet conditions, it is difficult to bring the infringing uploader to the court because of the following: (1) due to technological limitation, we can only obtain the IP address of the computer that the uploader uses. It is difficult to search for the owner of the compu,,,,t,er using the IP address which is a digital sequence of four sections. We can learn about the region, industry or department indicated by the first sections, but it is hard, if not impossible, to affix the computer corresponding to all the four sections. It is like looking for a telephone number not included in the Yellow Pages or 114 directories. We can know the first few digits which represent the office number, but are impossible to locate the telephone set corresponding to all the digits. (2) If a dynamic IP address (which is, for example, used by a whole dormitory or an entire building) is used, it is difficult to fix the uploading computer even if the area to which the dynamic IP address is assigned is known. (3) Even if the uploading computer is fixed, but if the computer is used by more than one person, it is still difficult to determine which person uploads the infringing content. In this case, the service of legal process is a big problem, for even service by publication would be impossible.

6. Application of the Case

a. Is It Advertisement?

According to the Advertisement Law of the People’s Republic of China, “the ‘advertisement’ here means commercial advertisements that a business operator or a service provider makes, by bearing the cost, through a certain medium and in a certain way, to directly or indirectly introduce the commodity of commerce or service promoted by it.” This author holds, consequentially, the act of keyword bidding does not lead to “the commodity of commerce or service,” but links to the website of the business operator or service provider, and such website contains advertisements among others. Currently, relevant administrations are working to prepare for a legal document on Internet-based advertising. Therefore, keyword bidding should not be found as advertisement.

b. Does a Promise Constitute the Basis of Infringement?

Some say that Baidu Time promised by itself that it had the obligation to examine keywords for possible infringement upon the rights of others. In the case, however, against this promise, Baidu Time contended that it was able to examine keywords for pornographic, gambling or drug abuse or trafficking information, or infringement upon Renowned Trademarks, but unable for infringement upon regular trademarks or business names. The failure of Baidu Time to fulfill its promise led to one of the other defendants using as its keyword the word of the business name of the plaintiff. Baidu Time was subjectively at fault and objectively helped such other defendant carry out the unfair competitive act, and should be held jointly and severally liable with such other defendant. An infringement should be established on the basis of legal stipulation. The promise of a party does not generally constitute a basis of infringement, and if unfulfilled, may constitute a breach of contract to the promisee; or an infringement upon the rights and interests of a consumer; or an unfair competitive act of false advertising to other competitors in the same industry.

c. Objects of the Right

The keyword bidding service provider should not be held at fault unless is has been proven that the bidding service’s actions were intentional or negligent regarding the applicant’s use of an infringing mark. In the opinion of this author, generally, the objects of the right infringed should be limited to Renowned Trademarks or other well-known marks (including but not limited to business names, shop names, website names and domain names), and exclude marks less well known; otherwise, the scope will be too broad.

Conclusion

The technology neutrality doctrine helps encourage technological progress, balance the interests between parties, and improve social welfare. If partially stressed, however, it might justify infringements with new technologies and damage social order and public interest. In judicial judgment, when individual cases are concerned, we should pay more attention to the legality of a concrete act, other than the legality or ethics in the business mode of the defendant. In judicial policy, the fault test should be so made that most network service providers, especially e-Business platform providers, are able to enter the safe harbor, but not otherwise. In this way, the authority and effectiveness of law will be enhanced, and the guiding dynamic role of judicial departments be improved. When the above conditions are met, the court will be able to award greater damages, handle serious infringements in a better way, and balance the interests between the parties. Moreover, effective judicial protection will be ensured for the transformation of economic development.

（Translated by Ren Qingtao）